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Abstract
This paper deals with the dependability evaluation of software programs of iterative
nature. In this work we define a model that is able to account for both dependen-
cies between input values of successive iterations and the effects of sequences of
consecutive software failures on the reliability of the controlled system. Differently
from previously proposed models, some effort is devoted to address the problem
of how to get accurate estimates for the basic parameters. A model is thus proposed
that, requiring the designers or users to provide information usually obtainable by
experimental techniques, e.g. testing, is more useful and more generally applica-
ble. Then a thorough analysis is performed to highlight the effects of the different
parameters on the dependability attributes. This analysis allows to appreciate which
effects (and their extent) have variations of both correlation between successive in-
puts and different structural characteristics of the software at hand. Moreover the
robustness of the model against imprecise assessments of the starting parameters is
also shown.2
1 Introduction
This paper deals with the dependability modelling and evaluation of software programs of it-
erative nature, typically software which controls the activity of some (physical) system. Most
control software has the following basic structure: the software performs a repetitive cycle of
sampling sensors and control input, using several control laws to compute the proper response
to the different actuators and then sending appropriate commands to the actuators. The focus is
here in modelling the behaviour of such software and analysing it over a specific time interval,
which constitutes a system mission.
The effective utility of a model depends on many factors, that may also relate to its intended
use. These include the realism, i.e. the plausibility of the assumptions made, but also very im-
portant are the ability to account for the relevant basic details, the robustness against inaccurate
values assigned to some parameters and the possibility or easiness to obtain proper estimation
of the parameters. A set of plausible values for the model parameters is normally derived from
testing or from previous experience with similar software. Usually, models kept simple by nu-
merous assumptions, have a limited realism although they may use parameters with a more in-
tuitive meaning and in some cases easier to determine than those required by more realistic
models.
The dependability of programs of iterative nature (as well as that of other software structures) is
usually analysed using models that assume independence between the outcomes of successive
executions of a program 1, 2, 3, 4. This assumption, which is often false for many applications,
strongly limits the realism of these models although it makes the associated mathematics sim-
pler 4. In fact, it allows to use constant probabilities of failure and success at each iteration for
the entire mission duration, with the additional advantage that such probabilities are easily es-
timable, e.g. through testing. However, experiments and theoretical justifications show the ex-
istence of contiguous failure regions in the program input space and that, for many applica-
tions, such as real-time control systems where iterations have usually short cycle duration, the
inputs often follow a trajectory of close points in the input space. For these reasons the inputs
which originate failures of the software are very rarely isolated events but more likely grouped3
in clusters 5, 6, 7. For all the classes of applications to which these considerations apply, analy-
ses of software dependability performed assuming independence between successive iterations
seem to lead to results excessively diverging from the real behaviour of the analysed system.
Another important characteristic of these applications that should be captured by a realistic
model (and usually is not) is the effect of clustering of failures of the software on the system
mission. The effects of software failures on the (physical) system are usually considered one
by one: a software failure either determines the failure of the system mission (commonly indi-
cated as catastrophic failure) or brings the system in a temporary undesirable, but still recover-
able, condition (benign failure). However, many systems, although able to tolerate isolated or
short bursts of benign failures, may not be able to survive to the lack of feed-back control for
too long. Hence, the occurrence of long sequences of even benign failures often cause actual
damage on the system (from stopping a continuous production process to letting an airplane
drift out of its safe flight envelope).
In this paper we offer two contributions to the modelling of both dependencies between input
values of successive iterations and the possibility that repeated, non fatal, failures may together
cause mission failure. The first concerns the problem of providing accurate estimates for the
basic parameters of the model. Instead of restricting to the definition of a model with the only
purpose of understanding the underlying mechanisms ruling the behaviour of a system in
which successive inputs are correlated (as was done in 8), we also consider the usability of the
model itself. We thus develop a new modelling framework using as basic knowledge informa-
tion that appears to be relatively easy and cheap to determine by experimental techniques if
compared with the difficulty to assess the system dependability indicators of interest. In this
way, an interesting compromise is reached between a fairly realistic model for obtaining pre-
dictions of dependability attributes of a system and difficulty (and costs) in obtaining the basic
knowledge necessary to resolve the model. The second contribution is an extensive analysis of
the developed model. The evaluation performed here allows to appreciate the kind and the ex-
tent of the effects of the various parameters on the reliability of iterative software. We analysed
the sensitivity of the model to three types of parameters representing:
i)  the correlation between successive inputs,4
ii)  the different structural characteristics of the software at hand, and
iii)  our starting parameters in order to check the robustness of the model against inaccurate
initial assessments.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief recall of the literature
and a discussion on the problem of how values for model parameters may be obtained. In Sec-
tion 3, the assumptions and the dependability measures we are interested in are first described,
and then a general model for iterative software is developed together with our proposed ap-
proach for obtaining accurate estimations of the parameters. Evaluations for specific classes of
iterative software are presented in Section 4. They show the effects of varying the parameters
expressing the correlation between successive inputs and the robustness of the model against
imprecise assessments of the starting parameters. Our evaluations include also the case of inde-
pendence among successive inputs when relevant for comparison purposes. Finally, Section 5
summarises our conclusions.
2 Background
The problem of modelling and evaluating the effects of correlation between the outcomes of
successive iterations has been addressed in the literature 8, 9, 10. Csenski 9 models the be-
haviour of a recovery block structure, first defined in 11 and subject of many papers after-
wards, composed of a primary version, an alternate version and a perfect acceptance test. Fail-
ures of the primary module are distinguished in :
i) point failure: when the input sequence enters a failure region,
ii) serial failure: a number of consecutive failures occurring after a point failure, i.e., after
that the input trajectory enters a failure region.
The number of serial failures subsequent to any point failure is a random variable. From these
modelling assumptions, a simple Markov chain with discrete time is developed allowing an
analytical evaluation of the reliability (MTTF) of the recovery blocks. Tomek and co-authors 10
analyse the different forms of correlation of the recovery blocks structure, including correlation5
among the different alternates and among alternates and the acceptance test on the same inputs.
While the previous two papers limit their modelling to the correlation between inputs, our work
8 considers also the possibility that repeated, non fatal software failures may together cause the
failure of the system mission.
However, the motivation in 8 was to understand the underlying mechanisms ruling a model in
which correlation between successive inputs is considered, rather than the definition of models
really usable. The starting parameters for that model are, in fact, the state transition probabilities
of the software system in its operational profile, whose estimation through experimental tech-
niques, e.g. testing or fault injection, is undoubtedly very difficult to obtain if possible at all,
and most of the times useless since the effort required may be comparable to estimate the de-
pendability figures of interest. These remarks motivate our interest in developing an alternative
process to obtain the same final evaluations as in 8, but relying on information which can be
derived by experimental methods in a simpler and cheaper way.
Experimental techniques have been proposed recently as an alternative approach to model-based
evaluation for assessing the dependability of critical systems. Traditional usage of testing and
fault injection has been aimed at improving the dependability of a system: testing allows to
identify residual faults to be corrected, while fault injection reveals faults which are not prop-
erly tolerated by the system. Recently, both techniques have been also proposed as means for
evaluating system dependability: testing by revealing residual faults 12, 13 and fault injection to
evaluate coverage and latency with respect to an assumed set of faults which can affect the sys-
tem and its components 14, 15. However, using these techniques for evaluation purposes turns
out to be significantly difficult and expensive. First, one has to collect enough experimental re-
sults so that accurate statistical inference about the dependability figures of interest can be
drawn. Second, the effectiveness of these methods involves issues such as choosing the most
appropriate inference procedure or deriving a realistic approximation of the user operational
profile. The knowledge of the characteristics of the system and the program to experiment upon
is, in fact, crucial. In the extreme case, once all the details about the operational environment
are known, one could derive directly, by using experimental techniques, estimates of the final6
quantities of interest. But, also in this ideal extreme case, the high costs involved make the
derivation of the final estimates using experimental techniques prohibitive.
An hybrid approach, where experimentation and analytical models are combined, seems to be
very effective, as addressed in 16, where the interactions between analytical dependability
modelling and experimental evaluation are discussed. Following this approach, at first experi-
mental evaluation (e.g., testing) is applied to derive basic information about the software under
analysis (thus making the implied costs affordable), which is then used as starting parameters
of an analytical model whose solution gives the dependability figures desired. This approach is
common sense for systems designed according to some well understood and proved-to-be-cor-
rect structure, where, instead of considering the system as a black-box, its internal structure is
taken into account as well. For example, a wide variety of models exist in the literature, such as
14, 17, to derive the dependability figures of fault tolerant structures starting from the figures of
their components. In such cases, testing (or fault injection) can be used to obtain an estimate of
the probability of failure/success of the individual components of the software system.
3 The Model
3.1 Assumptions and Dependability Measures
Software (seen as a black box) of an iterative nature is assumed, as typically used in control
systems. The system is controlled by a static periodic scheduling policy such that each iteration
is started cyclically after a time interval of constant width t and is aborted by a watch-dog timer
should it last more than the time threshold t. Thus, a mission, of a given duration T, may be
considered as composed of a constant number n  = T/t of iterations.
At each iteration, the program accepts an input and produces an output. The outcomes of an
individual iteration may be: i) success, i.e., the delivery of a correct result, ii) a benign failure
of the program, i.e., an output that is not correct but does not, by itself, cause the entire mis-
sion of the controlled system to fail, or iii) a catastrophic failure, i.e., an output that causes the
immediate failure of the entire mission. From the software viewpoint solely, and without refer-7
ring to any specific application, we assume here that all detected failures (default safe values of
the control outputs from the computer) do not prevent the mission to continue and are in this
sense benign, whereas undetected failures are conservatively assumed to have a "catastrophic"
effect on the controlled system. Obviously, if knowledge of the consequences of software fail-
ures on the system was available for a specific system, the proper splitting of software failures
into benign and catastrophic could be precisely made.
Failure regions, consisting of contiguous points, are subsets of the program input space for
which the output produced violates the specifications. In 7, besides showing that for some pro-
grams failure regions are made of contiguous points and providing some theoretical justifica-
tions for this conjecture, it is also shown that the shapes can be often angular, elongated and
rectangular.
The successive inputs form a "trajectory": any input value is assumed to be close (but not nec-
essarily contiguous) to the previous one. We have a so called random or deterministic walk
trajectory with a small step length. The step length, i.e., the distance between two successive
input points, is considered small if the difference of the values of the two points on each di-
mension of the input space is small compared to the size of the input space in that dimension. If
the step length becomes comparable to the size -in each dimension- of the input space (e.g.,
50%) then, as shown in 6, we obtain uniform distribution of the inputs and therefore indepen-
dence. In such a context many different trajectories may be considered. Examples are: 1) the
next input is obtained from the previous one by modifying the values on each dimension by a
random small quantity, 2) (subcase of 1) a "forward-biased" trajectory: passing from one input
to the next the direction may only change slightly, 3) (subcase of 2) a trajectory of points on a
straight line, at a random, small distance from each other.
The hypotheses we make in modelling sequences of correlated failures are:
1) sequences of benign failures equal or longer than a threshold nc, nc >0, cause the failure of
the entire mission, thus having the same effect as a catastrophic failure. A single success
before the nc-th consecutive failure will bring the system into a stable state, i.e. the memory8
of the previous failure sequence is immediately lost. Of course, the assumption that any se-
quence of up to nc-1 failures will be tolerated, and all longer sequences will be catastrophic,
is still a simplification of reality, yet more realistic than assuming that a controlled system
can tolerate any arbitrary series of benign failures. The purpose of assuming that a single
success before the nc-th consecutive failure causes the loss of the memory of the previous
failures is to keep the developed model easy to understand. In any case there are no particu-
lar difficulties to extend the model to represent the need of a given number of successes to
loose memory of the previous failures;
2) the trajectory of the input sequence is "forward-biased": passing from one input to the next
the direction may vary with a small angle. Actually, many applications (e.g., radar systems
or navigation systems) control systems possessing physical inertia. In these cases, the suc-
cessive values of many physical quantities provided by sensors and used as inputs by the
control software show "forward-biased" trajectories;
3) the failure regions are convex and separated by each other: to pass from one to another the
input trajectories must cross at least one point for which the program executes successfully.
This separation of failure regions reflects the users view: they perceive a set of contiguous
failure points as one single region. A designer or analyst would have a different perspec-
tive: they would characterise a failure region as the set of inputs for which the same fault of
the software is activated. In this case, failure regions need not to be made of contiguous
points, regions may overlap and may not surrounded by points for which the program exe-
cutes successfully. Assuming convex failure regions determines that our forward biased
trajectories, once they have left a failure region, are unlikely to re-enter soon the same fail-
ure region just left. We can thus consider in our models the probability of entering a failure
region as a constant. This is actually the main rationale for choosing convex regions: since
there is no evidence for choosing particular shapes on a general basis, our choice is driven
by the necessity to simplify the modelling. It is however clear that our model represents an
approximation of the real system behaviour when concave failure regions are considered,
since in this case the probability of entering a failure region varies depending on the trajec-9
tory being close to the border of a concave failure region. Moreover the assumption of con-
vex failure regions is also conservative in the sense that, for a given size of a failure region,
trajectories become more likely to stay longer in the region.
Among the various attributes of dependability, we restrict here on the probability of surviving a
mission (which in our particular case of static periodic scheduling corresponds to the reliability
after a certain number of executions). Other dependability attributes, like performability and
safety, are not so interesting in our scenario. In our context a mission is composed of a con-
stant number of iterations and only two different accomplishment levels, besides mission fail-
ure, are defined, thus the performability measure 18 purely reflects the reliability. To verify
this, in 19 the expression of the performability was derived, based on a simple reward function,
and its numerical evaluation performed. As expected, the results indicated the same trends for
the reliability and the performability, thus showing the uselessness of performing a performa-
bility analysis. On the other side, an effective estimation of the safety of computer controlled
systems would require a wide knowledge of the system itself and not just of its software. It is
very difficult to determine which software failures have catastrophic consequences on the entire
system. Moreover this analysis must be performed on the specific application considered and
cannot be done on a general basis.
3.2 Derivation of Estimates for the Basic Parameters
Now we describe the procedure to follow for providing estimates for the basic parameters of
the model for the software under analysis that will be presented in the next subsection.
We assume that a realistic distribution of inputs can be generated by synthesising the population
of trajectories expected for our system in its operational profile. Individual inputs are then used
to test the program in a testing regime that is an approximation of the operational environment
of the system under analysis. In detail, differently from the operational environment, here: i)
the effects of sequences of benign failures are not taken into account (no mission failures are
due to sequences of benign failures); and ii) missions are not of a fixed duration but they are
terminated only by the occurrence of a pointwise catastrophic failure (after a catastrophic failure10
the program is reset to the initial state). A sufficiently long test activity on individual inputs,
where many missions are linked together, allows to determine quite easily the probabilities ps,
pb and pc of success, benign failure and pointwise catastrophic failure respectively, which can
be interpreted as "steady state probabilities" relative to the input distribution. Aiming at the de-
termination of steady state probabilities does not require accounting for the specific paths lead-
ing to the selected state. The estimation of probabilities on the specific paths is instead the in-
formation that must be collected to solve models requiring values for the state transition prob-
abilities. Therefore, having to collect less information and using individual inputs rather than
trajectories, makes testing for determining steady state probabilities much cheaper than for de-
termining state transition probabilities.
The steady state probabilities of the system in this testing regime, together with parameters ex-
pressing the correlation and structural properties, are used to find an accurate estimate of the
state transition probabilities of the software (which are the same both for the testing regime and
the operational environment). Clearly, the quality of the measured probabilities heavily depends
on how properly the inputs used for testing represent trajectories encountered by the program
during its operational lifetime. It must be also noticed that here we assume that the steady state
probabilities ps, pb and pc have been determined by testing although they could be provided
following alternative approaches. Actually, from the point of view of our modelling effort, only
the fact that this knowledge can be reasonably provided really matters.
The model described by the Markov chain in Figure 1 represents the system in the testing
regime and shows more details than strictly implied by the testing activity. The state represent-
ing the benign failure is split in an infinite number of states Bi, where the state Bi is reached
from S when the input trajectory enters a failure region and remains in it for i iterations (if no
catastrophic failures are encountered). The state transition probability from state S to state Bi is
defined as psb ×pi, where psb represents the probability to enter a failure region and pi the prob-
ability to encounter a failure region of length i. Then, the steady state probability of benign fail-
ure must be seen as the sum of the probabilities pbi of being in state Bi, that is pb = pbi i=1
¥ å .
Transitions from state C to states S, Bi and C, all with the same probabilities as transitions11
from S, model the reset of the software system to the initial state after the occurrence of a
catastrophic failure. We account for the assumption that each trajectory, after crossing a failure
region, experiences at least one successful execution: B1 is the state reached after the last failure
in the crossed region and we assign the value 1 to the arc from the state B1 to S. State S repre-
sents a success and when it is reached the system looses memory of previous possible benign
failures. If instead of needing a single success to cancel the effects of the previous failures, Ns
successes would have been required, then the state S would have been substituted by a set of
Ns states Si, connected with arcs to both states Bi and the state C. The only complication to
solve the resulting model would be the mathematics, but no particular problems would arise.
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Figure 1. The model used to derive the state transition probabilities.
This general model takes into account the correlation between successive inputs through the pa-
rameters pi on the arcs from S to the states Bi, without being tied to any specific distribution
representing the permanence of the input trajectory in failure regions. The following matrix P is
its transition probability matrix.12
              S  B1    B2 ××× Bi  Bi+1 ××× C
 P= 
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For all the distributions p, such that the Markov chain is irreducible, aperiodic and with all re-
current non-null states, the vector (ps, pb1,....,pbi,...., pc), representing the steady-state distri-
bution of the probabilities of staying respectively in the states S, B1,......., Bi,......, and C, is
the unique solution to the equation system 3.1:
(ps,pb1,...,pbi,...,pc)=(ps,pb1,...,pbi,...,pc)×P
ps+ pbi i å +pc =1
ì
í
ï
î ï
3.1
Our aim is now to derive the transition probabilities (pss, psc, psb, pbb and pbc), but, unfortu-
nately, the available information, that is the probabilities pb, ps and pc plus the pi's representing
the distribution of the length of staying in failure regions, is not sufficient. Further information
may be obtained by analysing the system; for example such analysis could suggest special rela-
tionships between transition probabilities. Some reasonable examples are the following:
a) a control software for which catastrophic failures occur independently from the trajec-
tory being crossing failure regions, thus the probability of a catastrophic failure is the
same if the last execution produced a benign failure or a success. Setting pbc = psc in
our model allows to represent this case;
b) a control software for which the probability of the next iteration producing a catas-
trophic failure increases if the last iteration produced a benign failure. This is modelled
by setting pbc>psc. This looks like a realistic assumption in many cases: for instance,
one may assume that a benign failure implies that the program has entered a region of its
input space where failure is especially likely, and that a fixed proportion of such failures13
happens to be immediately catastrophic, or a system suffering from imperfect recovery
such that when the recovery procedure is activated, failures are more likely to occur;
c) the case of a controlled system where most erroneous control signals are immediately
"catastrophic", but the control software is engineered to detect its own internal errors
and then issue a safe output and reset itself to a known state from which the program is
likely to proceed correctly. One may then assume that most benign failures are due to
this mechanism, and likely to be followed by successes: 0<pbc<psc;
d) the extreme of case c) above: the control software issues a safe output but after the reset
takes place pointwise catastrophic failures cannot immediately happen (pbc = 0).
The different situations illustrated can be summarised with the relation p k p bc sc = × , where k is
a non negative real number. We can thus determine the values of the transition probabilities as a
function of k and of the distribution of pi. In Section 4 we will discuss the effects of these sce-
narios (assigning proper values to k) on the probability of mission failure. Two cases (k =0 and
k >0) have been distinguished for mathematical reasons and the resulting expressions are re-
ported in Table 1. We detail here the derivation of the transition probabilities for the case k=0.
In this case, pbc=0, pbb=1 and the system 3.1 reduces to:
ps =pss×ps +pb1 +pss×pc
pb1 =psb×ps×p1+pb2 +psb×pc×p1
...
pbi =psb×ps×pi +pbi+1 +psb×pc×pi   i=2,3,...
...
pc =psc×ps +psc×pc
ps + pbi i å +pc =1
ì
í
ï
ï
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
ï
ï
From the equation for pc, the expression for psc is immediately derivable: psc =
pc
1-pb
To obtain the expression for psb we first derive pb1:
pb = pbi i=1
¥ å = psb × 1-pb ( )× pi i=1
¥ å + pbi i=2
¥ å  which can be manipulated as:
pbi - pbi i=2
¥ å i=1
¥ å = psb × 1-pb ( )× pi i=1
¥ å  from which pb1 = psb × 1-pb ( ).14
Then, from the equation for pbi, we get  pbi+1 = pbi -psb × 1-pb ( )×pi; substituting pbi with its
expression in terms of pbi-1 recursively up to pb1 and using the expression for pb1 just found:
pbi+1 = psb × 1-pb ( )-psb × 1-pb ( )×p1-...-psb × 1-pb ( )×pi and then
pbi+1 = psb × 1-pb ( )× 1- pj j=1
i å ( ) that is pbi+1 = psb × 1-pb ( )× pj j=i+1
¥ å .
Using the last expression in pb:
p p p p p p b b i b i sb b j j i i i i = = = × - ( )×
=
¥
=
¥
= +
¥
=
¥ å å å å + 1 0 1 0 1 1    that is
pb = psb × 1-pb ( )× k×pk k=1
¥ å , from which psb =
pb
1-pb ( )× k×pk k=1
¥ å
.
Once obtained the expressions for psc and psb, pss can be immediately derived:
pss =1-psb -psc =
ps× i×pi i=1
¥ å -pb
1-pb ( )× i×pi i=1
¥ å
.
k = 0 k > 0
pbb
1
1-pbb
k
=
pc -pb × 1-pbb ( )
1-pb ( )
+
+
pb × 1-pbb ( )
2 × pbb
i-1×pi i=1
¥ å
1-pb ( )× 1-pbb × pbb
i-1×pi i=1
¥ å ( )
pbc 0 1-pbb
psb
pb
1-pb ( )× i×pi i=1
¥ å
pb × 1-pbb ( )
1-pb ( )× 1-pbb × pbb
i-1×pi i=1
¥ å ( )
psc
pc
1-pb
1-pbb
k
pss
ps× i×pi i=1
¥ å -pb
1-pb ( )× i×pi i=1
¥ å
1
1-pbb × pbb
i-1×pi i=1
¥ å
-
pc
1-pb
+
+
2×pb ×pbb -pb -pbb ( )× pbb
i-1×pi i=1
¥ å
1-pb ( )× 1-pbb × pbb
i-1×pi i=1
¥ å ( )
Table 1. Expressions for the transition probabilities in case of k = 0 and k > 0.15
Note that in the case of k > 0 an implicit expression for pbb is given. So we have to solve nu-
merically the equation for pbb to obtain values for the other transition probabilities. The solution
must refer to specific distributions of probability and is restricted to those distributions such
that it is possible to give a finite expression equivalent to  pbb
i-1×pi i=1
¥ å . For a number of dis-
tributions this expression is known 20 and we will show the numerical results for some of
them.
3.3 The Proposed Model
The model representing the program in its operational context is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. The model for the program in its operational context.
This model accounts for the two different characteristics we neglected in the previous model:
sequences of nc or more benign failures cause the controlled system to fail and missions last at
most n iterations. Furthermore, a mission terminates successfully if no pointwise catastrophic
failure or sequences of at least nc benign failures are experienced, otherwise terminates with
failure as soon as one of these two events is observed. Compared to the model of Figure 1, all
states Bi, for i ³ nc, disappeared and the term psb ×pnn, where pnn = pi i=nc
¥ å , has been
added to the arc from S to C to capture that sequences of benign failures longer than nc -1 now16
lead to a mission failure. A simplification has been here introduced, since the exact modelling
of sequences of nc or more failures requires a sequence of nc states (including C) instead of
simply adding the probability psb ×pnn on the arc from S to C. However, the error introduced
by such simplification is negligible, as better detailed in 21.
The values for the transition probabilities, derived from the model of Figure 1, can be applied
and the model solved very easily. The solutions are expressed in terms of the parameters ps,
pb, pc, k, nc and the distribution of the length of staying in a failure region. The parameter k is
a characteristic of the considered software. With nc-1 we represent the maximum number of
consecutive benign failures that can happen without causing the mission to fail, i.e., the inertia
of the system, thus it determines the resilience of the controlled system. Last the distribution
function describes the length of stays in failure regions; it depends on the trajectories and the
failure regions of the input space.
3.4 Probability of Surviving a Mission
The general expression for the probability of surviving a mission of a constant number n of it-
erations is the following:
P mission success ( )= P Xi ¹ C | Xi-1 ¹ C ( )
i=1
n
Õ , where:
P Xi ¹ C | Xi-1 ¹ C ( )=1-P Xi = C | Xi-1 ¹ C ( )=
=1- psc +psb ×pnn ( )×P Xi-1 =S| Xi-1 ¹ C ( )-pbc×P Xi-1 = B2 or... or Xi-1 = Bnc-1| Xi-1 ¹ C ( )
It can be observed that the second and third terms in the last expression represent the probabil-
ity of the occurrence of mission failure at the generic iteration. The second term collects the
probability of mission failure after a success, due either to the occurrence of a pointwise catas-
trophic failure or to the entrance in a failure region in which the application remains for more
than nc-1 iterations. The third term is the probability of pointwise catastrophic failure after a
benign failure (that is, while in a failure region).17
4 Evaluations Results
In this section we analyse the model proposed in Section 3.2 in order to capture the effects de-
termined by variations of the several parameters. We start by analysing the effects on reliability
of different distribution functions of the length of stays in failure regions. Actually we use dis-
tribution functions belonging to different families (with the same values of pnn, the probability
of exceeding nc-1 consecutive failures). For a better understanding, we also separate the contri-
bution to the probability of mission failure due to serial failures and to pointwise catastrophic
failures. Then we investigate on the changes due to the different structural characteristics of the
software considered in the previous section by varying the parameter k. Next, we perform an
analysis of the variations of the reliability as a function of the probability ps obtained by testing,
fixing all the other parameters and considering two different values for the ratio between pb and
pc. In this way the robustness of our model against inaccurate assessment of the starting pa-
rameters can be checked. Last, we show the impact of varying the critical threshold nc
(representing the resilience of the controlled system). These analyses include, whenever appro-
priate, also the case of absence of correlation between successive inputs, to allow comparison
with the independence assumption.
4.1 Distribution Functions, Parameters and their Assigned Values
The distributions we include in our analysis are some common distributions from the literature
and some special limiting distributions, one of which can be shown to provide lower bounds
on the dependability figures while the others are useful to explain some tendency. These distri-
butions are:
- geometric distribution defined as: pi = q(1- q)i-1,i ³1 for q Î (0,1) and p 1 =1,
pi =0, i ³2 for  q=0;
- modified Poisson distribution defined as: pi =
e-aai-1
i -1 ( )!
,i ³1, a > 0;
- modified negative binomial defined as: pi = i + r - 2
r -1
æ
è
ö
øqr 1- q ( )
i-1,i ³1, qÎ(0,1) and
r ³1 (we use r=5) or p1 =1, pi =0, i ³2 for q=0;18
and, once a value for pnn has been fixed,
- a distribution d1 defined as: p1 = 1- pnn ( ) , pnc = pnn and pi =0 for i ¹1 and i ¹  nc;
- a distribution d2 defined as: p1 =
1- pnn
2
, pnc-1 =
1- pnn
2
, pnc = pnn and pi = 0 for
i ¹ 1, i ¹ nc-1 and i ¹ nc;
- a distribution d3 defined as: pnc-1 = 1- pnn , pnc =
pnn
2
, p2nc =
pnn
2
 and pi = 0 for
i ¹ nc-1, i ¹ nc and i ¹ 2nc.
The number of iterations in a mission, n, is 106 (a realistic number, e.g., for civil avionics
where the average duration of one iteration could be 20-50 milliseconds and the mission  dura-
tion could be around 10 hours). The meaning of the other parameters has already been de-
scribed. Thus Table 2 reports the default values used for each parameter in those evaluations in
which it is assumed as a constant; when variations of a given parameter are used, the variation
range is explicitly indicated.
Parameter     values
pb = 5 10-5
pc = 10-11
ps = 1- pb - pc
nc = 10
n  = 106
k = 100
pnn =2 10-5
Table 2. Parameter values used in the evaluation.
4.2 Effects of Different Distributions of the Length of Stays in
Failure Regions
In this subsection we evaluate the probability of mission failure obtained from the model as a
function of the variation of the probability of exceeding a sequence of nc-1 consecutive failures,
pnn. We use the six distributions previously described to model the length of stays in failure19
regions, a variation range from 0 to 5 10-5 for pnn and the values shown in Table 2 for the
other parameters. Figures 3 shows the probability of mission failure.
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Figure 3. Probability of mission failure as a function of pnn.
First it can be noticed that for all the distributions the probability of mission failure increases for
increasing values of pnn. This is obviously as expected: the higher the probability of encounter-
ing sequences longer than nc-1 of benign failures, the higher is the number of mission failures.
Second, the various distribution functions show different behaviours for the same value of pnn.
This difference seems to depend primarily on their respective mean: the reliability measures
obtained for the various distributions are ranked in the same order as their means. d1 has the
lowest mean and shows the worst behaviour among all the distributions while d2 and d3 show
the best behaviour and have the highest mean.
To improve understanding, we separately analysed the probabilities of the two events contribut-
ing to the probability of mission failure P(Cn), that is the probability of pointwise catastrophic
failure (denoted with ppoint) and the probability of occurrence of a series of more than nc-1 be-
nign failures (denoted with pserial). ppoint depends on psc and pbc, while pserial depends on
psb ×pnn. Since the figures obtained for the various distributions were quite similar among
them, we show in Figure 4 the plots of ppoint, pserial and P(Cn) for the geometric and the mod-
ified Poisson distributions, for the same setting of parameters as in Figure 3. To improve read-
ability, only one curve has been shown for ppoint because this quantity is nearly the same for20
the two considered distributions. Figure 4 shows that i) the value of ppoint is nearly constant
while pserial varies for different distributions, and ii) pserial constitutes the dominant contribu-
tion to P(Cn) (apart for values close to zero of pnn where the influence of ppoint is dominant).
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Figure 4. ppoint and pserial as function of pnn.
Point i) above allows to explain the role of the mean of the distributions. Distributions with low
mean represent input trajectories crossing failure regions more often but with a shorter perma-
nence than those represented by distributions with higher mean. Thus, the lower the mean of a
distribution, the higher becomes the corresponding probability psb. (For k =0, this result de-
rives directly from Table 1, where psb is inversely proportional to the mean of the length of
stays in a failure region.) Hence, having the same value for pnn, distributions with lower mean,
i.e., higher values for psb, show higher pserial  and thus a worse behaviour.
4.3 Different Scenarios
In Section 3 we have introduced the relation pbc = k×psc to solve the equation system 3.1 and
explained how different scenarios can be modelled by assigning different values to the parame-
ter k. The aim of this subsection is to investigate on the consequences of the scenario changes.
We computed the probability of mission failure for different values of k (ranging from 0 to21
107), with pnn variable from 0 to 5 10-5 and the values in Table 2 for the other parameters. The
distributions considered in this analysis have been the geometric, the modified negative bino-
mial and the modified Poisson. The figures obtained for the various k were so close to each
other that plotting them would have been useless. So, we decided to show in Figure 5, for each
distribution, the plot of the difference on the probability of mission failure between the highest
(where k =0) and the lowest (where k =107) values obtained.
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Figure 5. Differences in the probability of mission failure for k = 0 and k = 107.
It can be observed that for all the three distributions the maximum difference is extremely low,
being at most of the order of 10-8 against absolute values of the order of 10-3 (see Figure 3).
Hence, we can conclude that the changes of k do not affect the total probability of mission fail-
ure, that is the reliability is practically insensitive w.r.t. scenario changes.
4.4 Robustness of the Model
Besides the possibility or easiness to obtain proper assessments of the parameters, another im-
portant factor to determine the effective utility of a model is its robustness against inaccurate
values assigned to some parameter. Here we analyse the reliability variations as a function of
the probability ps, fixing all the other parameters and considering two different values for the
ratio between pb and pc. Figures 6 and 7 show respectively the probability of mission failure
for pb = 106 pc and pb = 104 pc, varying 1-ps from 10-6 to 10-4. In the Figures we included22
also the probability of mission failure in the case of independence between successive inputs.
In this case, we have pnn = pb
nc 1- pb ( ) and a very low probability of incurring in a se-
quence of benign failures equal or longer than nc. Due to the irrelevant contribution to P(Cn)
given by pserial the case of independence can be therefore considered a lower bound for the
probability of mission failure that can be expected given ps, pb and pc.
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Figure 6. Probability of mission failure as a function of ps, with pb = 106 pc.
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Figure 7. Probability of mission failure as a function of ps, with pb = 104 pc.
A few considerations with respect to the sensitivity to ps follow. First it can be noticed that, in
the entire range we considered, the error in estimating P(Cn) because of a wrong value assigned
to ps depends only on how inaccurate the estimate is. There are no critical subsets in the range23
in which the inaccuracy is particularly dangerous. For the same ratio between pb and pc the
curves show that an error in the estimate of ps (say of 10%) determines an error of the same or-
der of magnitude in the expectation of P(Cn). In Figure 7, one can appreciate that this holds
also for the case of independence. Last, it can be noticed that lowering the ratio between pb and
pc, i.e., passing from pb = 106 pc to pb = 104 pc, the probability of mission failure in-
creases, and the curves show bit higher slopes: P(Cn) is a bit more sensitive to variations of ps.
Furthermore, the curves in Figure 7 are much closer to each other and are ranked in the same
order than those in Figure 6. Actually the absolute distance between any two curves for the
same value of ps is almost the same both in Figure 6 and in Figure 7. To explain this one must
notice that the values for pc change of orders of magnitude and this significantly increases the
probability of pointwise catastrophic failures while those for pb remain approximately the same:
leaving pnn unchanged for each distribution the same contribution to mission failure due to se-
quences of benign failures is obtained.
4.5 Resilience of the Controlled System
Last we show the effect of varying nc. This analysis is interesting for software suitable for sev-
eral physical systems; different values of nc represent the different inertia of the controlled sys-
tems. We perform an evaluation assuming that, changing the environment, the distribution
function of the length of stays in a failure region remains unchanged. Figure 8 shows the prob-
ability of mission failure in a logarithmic scale for the geometric, modified Poisson, modified
negative binomial distributions and for the case of independence between successive inputs.
The used distribution functions are fixed in accordance with the values reported in Table 2. The
range chosen for nc extends from 2 to 16 (for values higher than 16 the probability of mission
failure does not show sensible variations).24
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Figure 8. Probability of mission failure as function of nc for given distributions.
As expected, growing values of nc imply a decrease of the value of pnn and, consequently, of
the probability of mission failure. For all the distribution functions considered, when pnn ap-
proaches zero, the probability of mission failure converge to the same value, which is the prob-
ability of mission failure due to pointwise catastrophic failures. Obviously, the independence
curve converge for a very low value of nc compared to the other distributions (3 against 16, for
our parameters setting).
1E-5
1E-4
2E-4
3E-4
4E-4
5E-4
6E-4
7E-4
8E-4
9E-4
1E-3
2 6 10 14 18 22 26 30
geometric
poisson
neg. binomial
d1
d2
d3
Critical threshold nc
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
 
P
(
C
n
)
Figure 9. Probability of mission failure as a function of nc (with fixed pnn).25
To complete our analysis on the effects of variations of nc, an alternative evaluation is per-
formed. The value for pnn is fixed (as reported in Table 2) so changes of nc imply changes in
the parameters of the distribution functions. In Figure 9 we show the probability of mission
failure with nc varying from 2 to 30, considering all the distribution functions reported in the
Subsection 4.1. Fixing the value of pnn, the variation of nc only affects the mean of the length
of stays in a failure region. Increasing values of nc imply higher values of the mean of these
distributions. As a consequence, reliability improves, as already discussed in Subsection 4.2.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we offered two contributions to structural models for predicting the dependability
of iterative software that account for both dependencies between input values of successive it-
erations and the possibility that repeated, non fatal, failures may together cause mission failure.
The first concerns the problem of providing accurate estimates for the basic parameters of
models. We extended the previous work by proposing a modelling framework and a procedure
for providing accurate estimates of the basic parameters of the models, thus addressing the
problem of the real usability of analytical models. The models developed use as basic knowl-
edge the steady state probabilities of the software system in a context where two characteristics
of the original environment are relaxed, namely; the possibility for repeated benign failures to
cause a catastrophic failure is not considered and the missions have not a fixed duration, but
after a catastrophic failure the software is reset to the initial state. In this context, steady state
probabilities appear to be relatively easy and cheap to determine if compared with the difficulty
to assess the system dependability indicators of interest. In this way, an interesting compromise
is reached between a fairly realistic model for obtaining predictions of dependability attributes
of a system and difficulty (and costs) in obtaining the basic knowledge necessary to resolve the
model.
The second contribution consists of extensive analyses performed to investigate on the effects
of variations of the various parameters on the reliability of iterative software. We analysed the
sensitivity of the model to the correlation between successive inputs, the different structural26
characteristics of the system at hand and to our starting parameters in order to check the robust-
ness of the model against inaccurate initial assessments.
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